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There is an established body of work showing that the sources of momentum returns change 
over time.  This paper finds that there is also winner/loser asymmetry - that the sources of 
the winner and loser components of momentum returns differ from each other at the same 
point in time.  Together, these results raise concerns about the prospect of finding a single 
cause for momentum profits, as most efforts to date have tried to do.  Rather, they indicate 
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1. Introduction 
 
"Buy low, sell high" is the common-sense maxim that causes the inexperienced trader to lose 
money on the stock market.  To the general public, "buy low" means buy when prices have 
fallen, and "sell high" means sell when prices have risen.  However, prices fall or rise for only 
one reason - because the market believes they are too high or too low.  Thus the 
inexperienced trader does the opposite of what they should do - buying high and selling low 
- with inevitable results. 
  
Correct interpretation of this common-sense maxim leads to buying when returns are high, 
even if prices are at their all-time high, and selling or short-selling when returns are low, even 
if prices are at their all-time low.  This strategy, when combined with the construction of a 
equally-weighted zero-cost portfolio, is known as "momentum investing".  First documented 
by  Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), it works in most market conditions, and is at the heart of 
several trading techniques used for many years by both technical analysts (Dunham, 2011) 
and investment funds (Grinblatt, Titman, & Wermers, 1995). 
 
Momentum investing relies on winner and loser persistence: the investor identifies the 
securities with the best and worst returns over the past few months – the winners and the 
losers – and bets that the winners will, on average, continue to outperform the losers over 
the next few months, regardless of the actual direction that either group takes.  This strategy 
is typically actioned by sorting securities on recent return, and forming an equally-weighted 
zero-cost portfolio, shorting the lowest decile to purchase the highest decile.  This Winners 
Minus Losers (WML) portfolio is held for a fixed period, and the repeating of this procedure 
each month yields a systematic profit, using only one return observation per stock per month 
to enter the market, and with a timed exit.  Thus momentum investing is a successful strategy 
that involves minimal information, effort and up-front costs. 
 
Momentum is considered anomalous in current market theories.  Modern Portfolio Theory 
constructs optimal return-maximising risk-minimising portfolios, yet momentum profits using 
equally weighted portfolios and takes no account of risk.  Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) 
assumes that prices move quickly to stable levels through trading, yet momentum assumes 
prices trend slowly.  The weak form of the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) states that it 
should be impossible to systematically profit based on no information but past prices, yet the 
typical execution of the momentum strategy profits from no information other than index 
membership and just two past price points per security.  This is why momentum is labelled 
the “premier anomaly” (Fama & French, 2008). 
 
While there are several risk-based and behavioural theories that attempt to explain the 
existence of the momentum anomaly, there is no compelling theory even after 25 years of 
study on over 200 years of market data (Asness, Frazzini, Israel, & Moskowitz, 2014).  These 
timeframes also highlight the anomaly’s persistence.  According to APT and the EMH, an 
anomaly as well-known and widely-used (in one form or another) as momentum should result 
in it being “arbitraged away” – the profitable holding period should shrink and the profitability 
should reduce as momentum trading becomes widespread.  Yet Vanstone and Hahn (2017) 
examined momentum with portfolio formation and holding periods from 3 to 24 months, 
showing that this has not happened. 
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It is clear that while the momentum anomaly is persistent it is not consistent, with widely 
varying profits (Antoniou, Lam, & Paudyal, 2007; Galariotis, 2010) and even short periods of 
significant losses (Barroso & Santa-Clara, 2015; Daniel & Moskowitz, 2013).  The inconsistency 
has led several authors to posit that in any one market, several of the “competing” theories 
behind momentum are all more or less true at different times, depending on market 
conditions (Du & Watkins, 2007; Grundy & Martin, 2001). 
 
Several authors have reasoned that momentum’s persistence is due not to risk-based or 
behavioural causes but to limitations on arbitrage.  Jacobs (2015) investigated this possibility 
for 100 financial anomalies, including momentum and several of what he labelled “enhanced 
momentum” papers.  While momentum sorts only by past returns, the enhanced momentum 
papers attempt to explain and improve on momentum’s performance by incorporating some 
additional piece of information into the sorting step (e.g. a dual-sort on past returns and one 
of price-to-book ratio, market capitalisation, number of analysts reporting on the security, 
volatility, 12-month high etc.).  Each additional variable is meant to represent some 
underlying hypothesis about a possible explanation for momentum returns (e.g. firm value, 
firm size, information availability, risk, behaviour etc.).   
 
Jacobs found little evidence to support the limitations-to-arbitrage thesis.  However, a study 
of the enhanced momentum papers he used yields two interesting observations not discussed 
in those papers or by Jacobs. 
 
The first stems from the fact that enhanced momentum portfolios are not momentum 
portfolios, having different constituents constructed via more complex ranking procedures 
incorporating extra information.  The more complex sorting makes it unclear whether excess 
returns are due to momentum or to sources outside of it.  Furthermore, this new information 
is often associated with some other well-defined market anomaly, making it unclear which 
anomaly is actually being studied.  Additionally, while momentum is the exemplar weak-form 
EMH anomaly, several of the enhanced momentum papers incorporate semi-strong-form 
information.  These concerns make it difficult to discern exactly what the enhanced 
momentum results say about the standard momentum anomaly. 
 
The second observation is that several papers claimed their added sorting variable affected 
one side of the momentum trade, but not the other.  That is, it has the effect of either 
increasing the return to buying winners only, or the return to short-selling losers only, but not 
both.  This raises the possibility of winner/loser asymmetry; i.e. that returns to winners and 
losers may be asymmetrically affected by security properties, market factors, information 
availability, risk, behaviour etc.  This calls into question the whole idea that the momentum 
anomaly yields to a single explanation – an assumption behind the majority of momentum 
papers.  This assumption has already been questioned by Du and Watkins (2007), who show 
that the sources of momentum profits change over time.  The general question at hand is 
whether there are multiple sources of momentum profits at any particular point in time, and 
the specific question is whether there are separate sources of profits from buying momentum 
winners and short-selling momentum losers. 
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The first contribution in this paper is to address the question of whether winner/loser 
asymmetry exists in standard momentum, in both the Australian and US markets.  The sorting 
variables from the enhanced momentum papers, along with other variables representing 
market conditions, are used as explanatory variables in separate linear models for returns to 
winners and returns to losers.  The winner and loser models are then compared by examining 
the differences in the importance, sign and magnitude of the coefficients, and by the models’ 
explanatory power.    The winner and loser models are found to contain a set of similar 
coefficients, and a set of dissimilar ones, indicating both symmetrical and asymmetrical 
components to the explanations for winner and loser returns.  Additionally, the models for 
returns to losers are found to have greater explanatory power than the models for winners.  
These results imply that there are separate sources of profits from momentum winners and 
momentum losers during any particular period and, together with Du and Watkins (2007), 
that no current single theory or linear model can explain momentum returns. 
 
The second contribution is the use of upper and lower semivariance in these models, both at 
the market and security levels.  While several of the enhanced momentum papers use 
volatility as their additional ranking variable in order to investigate whether risk is a factor in 
momentum, none of these papers were specifically looking for winner/loser asymmetry.  As 
winners (losers) suffer from downside (upside) risk but benefit from upside (downside) risk, 
dropping the assumption of symmetric variance is natural for this investigation, and the 
results clearly indicate that winner and loser returns have different exposures to each. 
 
A third finding is that several of the enhanced momentum results were found to have little or 
no explanatory power for standard momentum winner and loser returns, indicating that at 




2. Literature Review 
 
Standard Cross-Sectional Momentum 
 
The seminal cross-sectional momentum paper is Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), but the WML 
method used dates back to Beaver and Landsman (1981).  They described the construction of 
two equally weighted portfolios – the winners and losers – based purely on immediate past 
residual return, and observed some systematic residual behavior, manifesting itself in a 
positive WML return associated with certain events such as earnings announcements.  De 
Bondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) adapted the procedure and identified the Long-Term 
Reversion anomaly – returns to winner (loser) portfolios that fall (rise) over timescales larger 
than a year.  They exploited the phenomenon by shorting the winner portfolio to partially 
fund the loser portfolio.  They also introduced the “J/K” terminology in common use with this 
methodology, with J standing for the number of immediate past months – the formation 
period - over which to calculate past return, and K standing for the number of future months 
– the holding period - over which to hold the constructed portfolio. 
 
This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Inglis, N., Vanstone, B. J., & Hahn, T. (2019). Modelling momentum winner/loser asymmetry: the sources of   
winner and loser returns in the ASX200 and S&P500. Accounting and Finance, 59(S1), 657-684, which has been published in final form at  
https://doi.org/10.1111/acfi.12452. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions. 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) reduced the timescale and used a zero-cost strategy, shorting 
the losers to fund the winners.  They found that returns to winner (loser) portfolios rise (fall) 
over several months, and thus identified and defined the cross-sectional momentum 
anomaly.  The canonical version of their method is as follows.  A set of liquid securities is 
ranked by their recent J-month returns, and divided into deciles.  The highest and lowest 
deciles of return are labelled “winners” and “losers”, and the intervening deciles are ignored.  
A zero-cost equally-weighted WML portfolio is constructed by shorting the losers to purchase 
the winners.    The portfolio is closed out after a holding period of K months.  This procedure 
is typically repeated each month, forming a staggered series of overlapping portfolios, 
yielding abnormal returns.  They performed experiments with values for J and K ranging from 
3 to 12 months, using NYSE and AMEX data from 1965 to 1989.  Analysis was performed for J 
= K = 6, which yielded an average compounded excess return of 12.01% per year.  J = K = 6 
remains the typical parameterization for momentum investigations in the literature. 
 
As a result of the persistence of momentum’s anomalous behaviour, Carhart (1997) 
supplemented the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993) with a 12-month past 
returns factor (i.e. a momentum factor with J = 12), stating “I employ the model to ‘explain’ 
returns, and leave risk interpretations to the reader” (Carhart, 1997, p. 61).  The momentum 
factor has since been reviewed positively in Fama and French (2012) and Asness et al. (2014); 
it appears frequently in the factor model literature, and both the three and four factor models 
are now academically mainstream (Dempsey, 2013).  However, being an empirical factor, it 
does not explain momentum; rather it attempts to measure it, leaving the explanation open 
as mentioned by Carhart.  This is true of all empirical factors, as detailed mathematically by 
Smith and Walsh (2013) regarding empirical factors in finance specifically, and more 
philosophically by McMullin (1968) regarding empirical factors in general.  The question of 
what theory or theories actually explains momentum thus remains open – a fact that Asness 
et al. (2014) note is one of several “myths” erroneously used as an argument to dismiss it as 
nothing more than a “hot potato” strategy.  
 
Australian WML and Momentum Studies 
 
Following on from Beaver and Landsman (1981) and De Bondt and Thaler (1985, 1987), the 
WML methodology was employed to investigate the long-term reversion anomaly in Australia 
by Brailsford (1992) and Allen and Prince (1995).  Both Australian studies reported an 
asymmetric result consistent with the US result of De Bondt and Thaler (1985), that price 
reversal was apparent for winners but not losers. 
 
Using the ASX Approved Securities list, positive results were reported for the standard 
momentum strategy by Hurn and Pavlov (2003) and Demir, Muthuswamy, and Walter (2004); 
and for variants of the strategy by Marshall and Cahan (2005), and Bettman, Maher, and Sault 
(2009).  Using the ASX200 members, positive results were reported for standard momentum 
by Galariotis (2010), who also lowered transaction costs and removed effects of data 
resampling by creating non-overlapping portfolios every J months, rather than the standard 
method of creating overlapping portfolios every month.  Schneider and Gaunt (2012) find 
evidence for both price and earnings momentum, using data from the Australian Graduate 
School of Management Centre for Research and Finance. 
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Again using the ASX200 members, positive results were reported by Vanstone, Hahn, and 
Finnie (2012) and Vanstone and Hahn (2013), who showed that momentum in Australia 
recovered after the Global Financial Crisis, and who tabulated results demonstrating both the 
long-term reversion anomaly and momentum anomaly occurring in the same data set for 
different values of J and K.  Vanstone and Hahn (2017) went on to find at least $1.5 billion in 
momentum-based funds under management in Australia, showing that momentum in 
Australia is far from being of purely academic interest. 
 
Time Varying Characteristics of Momentum 
 
There are many papers documenting the time-varying nature of the momentum anomaly.  
Hon and Tonks (2003) find that momentum is only apparent in certain time periods in the UK 
stock market.  Antoniou et al. (2007) find that momentum profits vary systematically with 
business cycles.  Galariotis (2010) finds that momentum results are positive but varying over 
time in the Australian market.  Daniel and Moskowitz (2013) find that momentum yields 
strings of negative returns in high-volatility market “panic” states following market declines, 
though as pointed out by Asness et al. (2014), this is true of any factor.  Barroso and Santa-
Clara (2015) find that the risk associated with momentum varies significantly and predictably 
over time, and use this to propose a risk-adjusted momentum strategy. 
 
While the above papers focus on the time-varying nature of momentum profits, others focus 
on the time-varying sources of those profits.  Grundy and Martin (2001) show that the WML 
method guarantees time-varying factor exposure, as the factors themselves may not exhibit 
momentum-like behaviour.  Du and Watkins (2007) find the sources of momentum profits to 
be time-varying also, and point out that this is a significant problem for current explanations 
for momentum which assume the sources are stable.  They decompose the sources into 
behavioural, lead-lag and risk factors, divide their data into 3 equally-sized time periods, and 
show that behaviour is the dominant factor in the first period, but lead-lag effects are 
dominant in the second and third periods. 
 
Further papers discussing the time-varying nature of momentum can be found in the 




In a paper seeking to determine whether market anomalies were more influenced by market 
sentiment or the limits of arbitrage, Jacobs (2015) reviewed and tested 100 different market 
anomalies, including the original Jegadeesh and Titman momentum paper, and 15 enhanced 
momentum papers.  Jacobs lists a set of 16 variables that these 15 enhanced momentum 
papers incorporate into the ranking step of their portfolio creation.   
 
In the source papers, ranking on the new variable sometimes occurred before ranking on past 
return, sometimes after, and sometimes in place of.  To unify his results, Jacobs retested each 
result, using a uniform procedure which involved ranking both variables independently, then 
combining those ranks as appropriate (usually by multiplying them) for each anomaly.  In 
doing so, he showed that the efficacy of each introduced variable is not somehow dependent 
on their original ranking procedures, but is inherent in the variable itself. 
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Each source paper investigated some hypothesis to explain momentum’s abnormal return.  
However, many of the papers used several variables to proxy for that hypothesis, and several 
variables appear in different papers proxying for different hypotheses.  This renders grouping 
the variables by original hypothesis impossible.  We instead group variables by their EMH 
information content.  The first group are those variables constructed purely from past price 
information and representing weak-form EMH information, starting with the simplest – 
momentum itself, and the previous 52-week high or low – and ending with volatility.  Volatility 
is variously associated with risk or information availability in the enhanced momentum 
literature, but as it is calculated using only past prices we include it here.  The second group 
of variables incorporate transaction volume information.  This information, like prices, is both 
public and directly related to actual trades, so it is perhaps arguable that this should also be 
considered weak-form EMH information.  However, it takes more effort to access and is used 
far less frequently.  The third group representing information availability is a little different, 
as these variables are trying to proxy for the availability or reliability of the above information.  
The fourth group of variables represent semi-strong-form EMH information.  None of the 
source papers or Jacobs discussed the use of private strong-form EMH information. 
 
The enhanced momentum variables, and the papers in Jacobs that employ them, are 
tabulated below, followed by a more detailed review of the papers associated with each 
variable. 
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Table 1: Enhanced Momentum Papers in Jacobs (2015) 
Factor References Variable Group 
Immediate Past Returns  Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) 
Price-Based 
Variables… 
Intermediate Past Returns  Novy-Marx (2012) 
Nearness to 52-Week High or Low George and Hwang (2004) 
Extremity of Formation Period 
Returns Bandarchuk and Hilscher (2013) 
Formation Period Return 
Consistency  Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004) 
Information Discreteness Da, Gurun, and Warachka (2014) 
Volatility Jiang, Lee, and Zhang (2005) Zhang (2006) 
… including 
risk 
Continuing Overreaction Byun, Lim, and Yun (2014) Volume-
Based 
Variables Turnover Ratio Lee and Swaminathan (2000) 




Firm Age Jiang et al. (2005) Zhang (2006) 
Analyst Coverage Hong et al. (2000) 
Analyst Forecast Dispersion Zhang (2006) 
Credit Rating Avramov, Chordia, Jostova, and Philipov (2007) Semi-Strong 
form EMH 
Variables 
Breadth of Ownership Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002) 
Book to Price Ratio Asness (1997) 





Immediate Past Returns 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) examine US return data from 1965 to 1989 and achieved a 
compounded excess return of 1% per month with a formation period of 6 months and a 
holding period of 6 months.  This represents the standard momentum configuration cited in 
most of the momentum literature. 
 
Intermediate Past Returns 
The simplest variation on this is by Novy-Marx (2012), who reports a 1.2% per month return 
using a holding period stretching from 12-months ago to 6 months ago, based on US data 
from 1926 to 2010.  Novy-Marx claims that this form of the momentum anomaly supersedes 
the information reliability and return consistency explanations of Hong et al. (2000) and 
Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004). 
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Nearness to 50-Week High or Low 
Another simple variation is by George and Hwang (2004), who rank on the ratio of the current 
price to the 52-week high instead of past return, also reporting just over 1.2% per month 
using US data from 1963-2001.  They claim that their result supersedes the volume study of 
Lee and Swaminathan (2000).  They also report an asymmetric result, in that no similar 
success was achieved using the ratio of the current price to the 52-week low.  (Note that both 
ratios were tested in the current study). 
 
Extremity of Formation-Period Returns 
Both of the previous enhanced momentum papers simply replace momentum’s ranking 
variable with an alternative.  With the following exception, the remaining papers use various 
forms of 2-variable ranking, with the standard momentum formation-period return plus an 
additional variable.  Typically, the new procedure involves filtering first by past return, then 
ranking on the new variables to form winner and loser portfolios, or filtering first by the new 
variable, then ranking on past return to form portfolios.  The claim of Bandarchuk and Hilscher 
(2013) is that these dual-sorting procedures work by selecting stocks with extreme past 
returns, and that this fully accounts for the results seen in many of the papers examined by 
Jacobs, notably Asness (1997), Daniel and Titman (1999), Lee and Swaminathan (2000), Hong 
et al. (2000), Zhang (2006), and Hou et al. (2006). 
 
Formation-Period Return Consistency 
Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004) examine US data from 1963 to 1999 and report an 
asymmetrical finding: that consistency of positive returns is important for predicting future 
positive returns, but consistency of past negative returns is irrelevant for predicting future 
negative returns.  This is somewhat similar to the asymmetry reported by George and Hwang 
(2004).  They also claim return consistency is more important than the information reliability 
and volume effects noted by Hong et al. (2000) and Lee and Swaminathan (2000) respectively. 
 
Information Discreteness 
Da et al. (2014) use daily price direction information (ignoring magnitude) over the formation 
period, and the monthly compounded return over 12 months, to create a measure of the 
information discreteness (ID).  Using US data from 1927 to 1992, they find that profits to 
momentum decrease (from a high of about 1% per month) with decreasing continuity of 
information arrival, claiming their “frog in the pan” hypothesis supersedes Lee and 
Swaminathan (2000), Daniel and Titman (1999), Hong et al. (2000), George and Hwang (2004), 
Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004), and Zhang (2006). 
 
Volatility 
Jiang et al. (2005) and Zhang (2006) use volatility as proxy for information uncertainty, though 
most literature outside the enhanced momentum set considers volatility as a proxy for risk.  
Both find that momentum returns improve with increased volatility.  In particular, Jiang et al. 
find that higher volatility results in lower future returns on average, but higher returns for 
momentum, using US data from 1965 to 2001, and countering the claims of Asness (1997) 
and Lee and Swaminathan (2000). 
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Byun et al. (2014) construct a continuing overreaction (CO) measurement, with the signs of 
the data points taken from returns but the magnitudes from volume traded.  Using US data 




Sorting first on returns then by turnover ratio (TR) using US data from 1965 to 1995, Lee and 
Swaminathan (2000) report 1.08% monthly returns, and the asymmetric result that extreme 
winners have a higher transaction ratio than extreme losers.   
 
The turnover ratio is one of two variables that incorporates the number of shares outstanding.  
This is not weak-form EMH information, being available only from company announcements 
and containing information about stock splits, merges, issuances etc.  However, its’ use here 
is as a scaling factor for volume of stocks traded, rather than as an additional information 
source.  Similarly, its use in the market capitalisation variable below is as a proxy for size 
rather than company news.  As market capitalisation is also calculated using the last closing 
price of the formation period, it is highly correlated with formation period return, and we 
therefore consider it as a weak-form variable. 
 
Information Availability Variables 
 
Market Capitalisation 
Hong et al. (2000) and Zhang (2006) both use market capitalisation as one of their proxies for 
information availability and certainty.  Hong et al. examine US data from 1976 to 1996, Zhang 
from 1983 to 2001.  Both detect a small firm effect - that momentum works better for smaller 
firms than larger ones.  Both interpret this in terms of information about smaller firms being 
less available and less certain than information about larger firms.  Hong et al. do not 
reference any enhanced momentum papers from the Jacobs set.  Zhang positively references 
Hong et al., and claims that the information certainty hypothesis supersedes Daniel and 
Titman (1999) and Lee and Swaminathan (2000). 
 
Firm Age 
Jiang et al. (2005) and Zhang (2006) use firm age as a proxy for information uncertainty.  Both 
find that momentum returns diminish with increasing firm age. 
 
Analyst Coverage and Analyst Forecast Dispersion 
Hong et al. (2000) and Zhang (2006) also use analyst coverage (the number of analysts 
reporting on a security) and analyst dispersion (the difference of opinion of analysts on a 
security) respectively, as measures of information availability and uncertainty.  Hong et al. 
find momentum works best for firms with low analyst coverage, with the effect being larger 
for past losers than for past winners. 
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Semi-Strong Form EMH Variables 
 
Credit Rating 
Using US data from 1985 to 2003, Avramov et al. (2007) find momentum strongest in firms 
with low credit rating, and non-existent in firms with high rating, claiming that a small number 
of poor firms account for a large proportion of momentum returns, and  that this result 
supersedes all of the information availability variables and papers mentioned above. 
 
Breadth of Ownership 
Chen et al. (2002) rank stocks on change in breadth of mutual fund ownership, using US data 
from 1979 to 1998.  They find winner minus loser returns of over 6%, reduced to 4.95% when 
controlling for momentum and other factors. 
 
Book to Price Ratio 
Using book-to-price ratio as the measure of value over US data from 1963 to 1994, Asness 
(1997) reported that value investing is enhanced if you first filter for momentum losers, and 
momentum investing is enhanced if you first filter for overpriced securities. 
 
R2 
Hou et al. (2006) set out to show that R2 is a measure of how well investors process 
information, rather than the more usual interpretation in the momentum literature as a 
measure of the market’s information efficiency.  They use momentum returns from 1963 to 
2002 as a proxy for investor overreaction, and find a negative relationship between R2 on a 
model on fundamental data and momentum return. 
 
Australian Enhanced Momentum Studies 
 
A number of papers have been written that confirm these enhanced momentum findings in 
an Australian context.  The aforementioned paper by Marshall and Cahan (2005) confirms the 
52-week high finding of George and Hwang (2004).  Hurn and Pavlov (2008) employ a similar 
size-based dual-sort procedure to Hong et al. (2000) and Zhang (2006) with similar results.  
Aharoni, Ho, and Zeng (2012) employ dual sorting based on both volatility and book-to-price, 
and report similar findings to Jiang et al. (2005) and Zhang (2006) for volatility and Asness 
(1997) for book-to-price.  Brailsford and O’Brien (2008) and O’Brien, Brailsford, and Gaunt 
(2010) conduct double- and triple-sorting respectively, to identify the relationships between 
the size, value and momentum.  Their findings are again similar to Hong et al. (2000) and 
Zhang (2006) regarding size, and Asness (1997) regarding value, with the additional 
asymmetric finding that the size effect is more marked in losers than winners.  In a larger 
study covering six anomalies, Dou, Gallagher, and Schneider (2013) find results consistent 
with Brailsford and O’Brien (2008), with the addition that momentum returns are negative 
for micro-cap stocks.  Additionally, Chan and Docherty (2016) find strong evidence of style 
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Markowitz (1959) used the term “semi-variance” to denote downside risk, and devoted a 
chapter to its definition, comparison to variance, geometric analysis, and calculation. In 
particular, he notes that variance is superior in terms of “cost, convenience, and familiarity”, 
but that variance considers extremely low and extremely high returns as equally undesirable, 
and that portfolios constructed using semivariance are superior in this regard (p.193).  Sortino 
and Satchell (2001) give an overview of the theory and applications of semivariance in 
financial markets.  Bond and Satchell discuss the use of semivariance in foreign exchange 
markets, finding mature markets to be far more symmetric than emerging markets (Bond & 
Satchell, 2002, 2006a, 2006b). 
 
While papers citing the use of semivariance in momentum studies are difficult to find, Post, 
Vliet, and Lansdorp (2009) is relevant to enhanced momentum in that it uses downside risk 
as a sorting factor for portfolio selection, finding it to have explanatory power over stock 
characteristics including the momentum factor.  No mention is made of upside risk – which is 
not surprising, as upside is not considered a risk per se outside the context of shorting.  
However, Farinelli and Tibiletti (2008) create an index for ranking assets using both downside 
and upside moments. 
 
Specific Asymmetry Findings 
 
Several of the momentum and enhanced momentum studies above reported various kinds of 
asymmetry, specifically: 
 
1. George and Hwang (2004) report success when ranking on the 52-week high, but not 
on the 52-week low; 
2. Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004) report that consistency of positive returns is 
important for predicting future positive returns, but consistency of past negative 
returns is irrelevant for predicting future negative returns; 
3. Lee and Swaminathan (2000) report that extreme winners have a higher transaction 
ratio than extreme losers; 
4. Hong et al. (2000) find momentum works best for firms with low analyst coverage, 
with the effect being larger for past losers than for past winners; 
5. Brailsford and O’Brien (2008) and O’Brien, Brailsford, and Gaunt (2010) report that 
the size effect is more marked in losers than winners. 
 
Independently, none of these findings is necessarily remarkable.  Collectively, they indicate 
the possibility that winner returns are more dependent on weak-form EMH information than 
loser returns (from results 1-3), whereas loser returns are more dependent on information 
availability than winner returns (from results 3-5).  Additionally, the observation was made 
that upside and downside risk would have opposite effects on the profitability of long winners 
and short losers, implying that asymmetrical risk would affect momentum profitability, but 
that all of the above studies either assumed symmetrical risk or did not take risk into account.  
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3. Methodology 
 
The momentum literature shows that the cross-sectional momentum anomaly is persistent 
but inconsistent, with momentum profits and the sources of those profits varying over time 
and with market states.  The enhanced momentum literature hints at the possibility that the 
sources of winner returns may be different from the sources of loser returns.  However, as 
enhanced momentum portfolios differ from momentum portfolios, we cannot assume that 
this possible asymmetry applies to momentum. 
 
To see if it does, (i.e. to test the hypothesis that standard momentum winner and loser 
portfolios have different sources of returns), we construct momentum winner and loser 
portfolios normally and model their returns separately.  To include the information that 
originally lead us to this hypothesis, we include several variables used for enhanced 
momentum portfolio construction from the papers studied by Jacobs (2015) in our set of 
candidate regressors.  To cater for the logic of Grundy and Martin (2001), that winners and 
losers are likely to have different exposures to the same market factors, we also include 
several market-factor variables in our candidate regressor set1.  To cater for our observation 
that winner and loser portfolios benefit and suffer from upside and downside risk in opposite 
ways, we use upper and lower semivariance in place of variance in our candidate regressor 
set.  To cater for the time-varying aspect of momentum, we divide our time period into 3 
equal periods as per Du and Watkins (2007)2.  We then use the Bayesian Information Criterion 
(BIC)3 to select six parsimonious models – a winner and loser model for each period.  Finally, 
we compare the winner and loser model in each period for factor inclusion, for coefficient 
sign, magnitude and significance, and for whether each included factor represents past prices, 
upside or downside risk, past volumes, information availability, semi-strong EMH information, 
or market state. 
 




Data was collected from Bloomberg L.P. (2016) for the S&P/ASX200 and the S&P500 indexes 
and their constituents, from March 1999 (12 months prior to the S&P/ASX200 index going 
                                                        
1 For our own situation, we use the following reasoning.  At any one time, the momentum winners portfolio 
can be in a rising, neutral, or falling state, and likewise the losers portfolio.  Thus, there are 9 possible 
combinations or winner/loser portfolio states, only 3 of which have winners and losers in the same state.  
Following on from the logic of Grundy and Martin (2001), we reason that returns to winners and losers must at 
least have different market-state exposures from each other for much of the time.  We thus include market 
variables in our separate models for winners and losers portfolios. 
2 General support for this approach comes from the seminal Chatfield (1995).  When discussing an alternative 
to using a weighted linear combination of time-series models, Chatfield suggested to “use different models to 
describe different parts of the data, rather than to pretend that a single model can describe all the data.  This 
applies particularly to time series analysis where the properties of the most recent data may differ markedly 
from those of earlier data and a global model fitted to all the data may give poor predictions” (p.429). 
3 The BIC is used to keep the models small in the spirit of Harvey, Liu, and Zhu (2016), who advocate setting a 
higher-than-normal bar for variable inclusion when creating models to explain the cross-section of returns.  
The BIC yields smaller models than the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) due to its higher penalty for variable 
inclusion (Chakrabarti & Ghosh, 2011). 
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live) to January 2016.  The Australian market was chosen as one where the existence of both 
standard and enhanced momentum have been clearly demonstrated both pre- and post- GFC, 
and where standard momentum is used in industry (Vanstone & Hahn, 2017).  Unlike the 
majority of US-based papers listed, which excluded closed-end funds, REITs and American 
Depository Receipts, the current equity-based study uses the constituents of the S&P/ASX200 
and the S&P500, and includes equities of all industry classifications. 
 
Returns for each month were then ranked by past 6-month return and divided into deciles, 
as per the standard momentum procedure of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993).  However, 
instead of subtracting loser returns from winner returns and reporting on the resulting return, 
separate 6-month future return regression models for were constructed for winner and loser 
returns, using as factors the enhanced momentum ranking variables from Jacobs, for which 
sufficient data was available in Bloomberg. 
 
Table 2: Bloomberg fields used for factor construction 
Factor Bloomberg Fields Used 
Immediate Past Returns  
Past price or past return fields: 
  DAY_TO_DAY_TOT_RETURN_GROSS_DVDS 
  PX_LAST 
  INTERVAL_LOW 
  INTERVAL_HIGH 
Intermediate Past Returns  
Nearness to 52-Week High or Low 
Extremity of Formation Period Returns 
Formation Period Return Consistency  
Information Discreteness 
Volatility 
Continuing Overreaction Volume fields:   PX_VOLUME 
  BS_SH_OUT  Turnover Ratio 






Analyst Coverage TOT_ANALYST_REC 
Analyst Forecast Dispersion  
Credit Rating Historical data not available in Bloomberg 
Breadth of Ownership  
Book to Price Ratio PX_TO_BOOK_RATIO 
R2 COEF_DETER_R_SQUARED 
 
Variable names and construction formulae are shown below.  Where practical, the variable 
names from the source papers were used. 
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Table 3: Factor variables and construction formulae 
Factor Source Variable or Formula 
Immediate Past 
Returns  
𝑅"#: the 6-month past return minus the risk-free rate.   
The 1-year risk-free rate was used for the ASX200, and the 6-month rate for the S&P500, as 
these rates had the best data availability in Bloomberg. 
Intermediate Past 
Returns  𝑅"%&'#: the return from the 6-months prior to 𝑅"# 
Nearness to 52-Week 
High or Low 
High and Low Ratios: 




Momentum Strength:  
 𝑀𝑆 =	𝑒| BCDE%FGHIJ'BCDE%FGKLMNOP,IJ	| − 1 
 
where 𝑅T4U.V/,# is the median of monthly returns for the past 6 months 
Formation Period 
Return Consistency  (Historical data not extracted at time of writing) 
Information 
Discreteness 
𝐼𝐷 = 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛E𝑅𝑗12J ∗ (%𝑛𝑒𝑔 −%𝑝𝑜𝑠) 
where 𝑅"%& is the 12-month past return; %𝑛𝑒𝑔,%𝑝𝑜𝑠 are the percentage of down and up days. 
Volatility 
𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑚 =	 1𝑛h(𝑟 − 𝜇)&2j	k  𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑚 =	 1𝑛h(𝑟 − 𝜇)&2nk  
where 𝑟 = logE1 + 𝑅"#,UV.+sJ and 𝑅"#,UV.+sis the daily return for the past 6 months 
andContinuing 
Overreaction 
𝐶𝑂 = ∑𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒  
where 𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑠 are the monthly signed volumes (i.e. the monthly 
volume, positive or negative if the monthly return was positive or negative), 
multiplied by a scaling factor, for the past 12 months; 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒 is the mean monthly volume for the past 12 months. 
Turnover Ratio 𝑇𝑅 = 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 
Market Capitalization 𝑀𝐶𝑎𝑝 = 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∗ 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 
Firm Age 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐴𝑔𝑒: in years 
Analyst Coverage 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑅𝑒𝑐: Monthly number of analysts recorded advising on the security 
Analyst Forecast 
Dispersion  
Credit Rating (Historical data not available in Bloomberg) 
Breadth of 
Ownership  
Book to Price Ratio 𝑃𝑥𝑇𝑜𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 
R2 𝑅&: The coefficient of determination for the security’s beta over the past 6 months 
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Transformations were then applied, which consisted of winsorising the accounting variables 
(the number of shares outstanding, and 𝑃𝑥𝑇𝑜𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜), taking the square root of 𝑅&, 
dividing 𝑇𝑅 by 100,000, and taking the log to base 10 of 𝑀𝐶𝑎𝑝, 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐴𝑔𝑒, 𝑃𝑥𝑇𝑜𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜, 𝑅"%&'# + 1, and 𝑀𝑆.  Note that as the source papers used these variables for ranking rather 
than regression, they offered no guidance regarding transformations.  We decided to 
winsorise only the accounting variables and not market data, due to the nature of the WML 
methodology which specifically includes the extreme decile returns while excluding the 80% 




Models are of the form: 
 𝑅,2,+., = 𝐸𝑀𝑉 +𝑀𝑉 = (𝑃𝑉 + 𝑅𝑉 + 	𝑉𝑉 + 	𝐼𝐴𝑉 + 𝑆𝑆𝑉) +𝑀𝑉 =	𝛽 + [𝛽%𝑅"# + 𝛽& logE𝑅"%&'#J + 𝛽𝐻𝑅 + 𝛽𝐿𝑅 +	𝛽5 log(𝑀𝑆) + 𝛽#𝐼𝐷]+ [𝛽𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑚 + 𝛽𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑚] + [𝛽𝐶𝑂 +	𝛽%𝑇𝑅]+ [𝛽%% log(𝑀𝐶𝑎𝑝)+	𝛽%& log(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐴𝑔𝑒) +	𝛽%𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑐] + [𝛽% log(𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑇𝑜𝑃𝑥𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜)+	𝛽%5𝑠𝑞𝑟𝑡(𝑅&)] + [6𝑅"#,TV274 +	𝛽%𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑚TV274+ 𝛽% 𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑚TV274 	+	𝛽% log(𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑇𝑜𝑃𝑥𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜TV274)] + 𝜀 
 𝐸𝑀𝑉 = 𝐸𝑛ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑	𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑚	𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑀𝑉 = 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡	𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑃𝑉 = 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒	𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑	𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑅𝑉 = 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘	𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑	𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑉𝑉 = 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒	𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑	𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝐼𝐴𝑉 = 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	𝐴𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦	𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑆𝑆𝑉 = 𝑆𝑒𝑚𝑖	𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔	𝐸𝑀𝐻	𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 
 
For stepwise regression, the above model was used as the full model, with the base model 
representing standard momentum: 







The winner and loser models for each period are shown below, for the ASX200 and the 
S&P500.  The table below each pair of models shows the number of regressors in each model 
categorised by regressor types discussed above, with each model containing up to 6 price 
regressors, 2 risk regressors, 2 volume regressors, 3 information availability regressors, 2 
semi-strong EMH regressors and 4 market factor regressors.  In the discussions that follow, it 
must be remembered that anything which positively (negatively) affects returns is beneficial 
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(detrimental) for the winners portfolio which is held long, and detrimental (beneficial) for the 
losers portfolio which is held short. 
 
ASX200, Period 1 (April 2000 – May 2005)  
 𝑅<.//42- = 0.841 − 706. 𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑚 + 295. 𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑚 − 0.0892. log(𝑀𝐶𝑎𝑝)+ 0.012.𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑐 − 0.75. 𝑅"#,TV274+ 	1.321. log(𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑇𝑜𝑃𝑥𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜TV274) + 𝜀 𝑅+,-42- = 1.177 + 0.843. 𝑃𝑅 − 0.0288.𝐶𝑂 − 0.177. log(𝑀𝐶𝑎𝑝) + 0.249. log(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐴𝑔𝑒)+ 0.195. log(𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑇𝑜𝑃𝑥𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜) + 0.959.𝑅"#,TV274+ 3.385. log	(𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑇𝑜𝑃𝑥𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜TV274) + 𝜀 
 
Table 4: Regressor counts for ASX200 Period 1 
 Winners Losers 
Price 0 / 6 2 / 6 
Risk 2 / 2 0 / 2 
Volume 0 / 2 0 / 2 
Information Availability 2 / 3 2 / 3 
Semi-Strong EMH 0 / 2 1 / 2 
Market Factors 2 / 4 2 / 4 
 
R2 is 0.10 for winners and 0.26 for losers, so loser returns are considerably better accounted 
for.  Returns to winners are explained by risk, information availability and market factors, 
whereas returns to losers are explained by past price and volume, information availability, 
value and market factors.  Winners are exposed asymmetrically to downside and upside risk, 
whereas losers are not significantly exposed to either.  Winners benefit from information 
availability whereas losers suffer from it.  Losers are more affected than winners by past 
market returns and market value. 
 
ASX200, Period 2 (June 2005 – June 2010) 
 𝑅<.//42- = 0.44 − 0.195. logE𝑅"#'%&J − 0.106. log(𝑀𝐶𝑎𝑝)+ 0.898.𝑅"#,TV274+ 20220. 𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑚TV274 − 23620. 𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑚TV274 + 𝜀 𝑅+,-42- = 1.281 + 0.406. logE𝑅"#'%&J + 0.42. log(𝑀𝑆) + 76.5. 𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑚	− 0.263. log(𝑀𝐶𝑎𝑝) + 0.0195. 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑐 + 1.481. 𝑅"#,TV274+ 14140. 𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑚TV274 − 12560. 𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑚TV274+ 2.544. log	(𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑇𝑜𝑃𝑥𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜TV274) 	+ 𝜀 
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Table 5: Regressor counts for ASX200 Period 2 
 Winners Losers 
Price 1 / 6 2 / 6 
Risk 0 / 2 1 / 2 
Volume 0 / 2 0 / 2 
Information Availability 1 / 3 2 / 3 
Semi-Strong EMH 0 / 2 0 / 2 
Market Factors 3 / 4 4 / 4 
 
R2 is 0.17 for winners and 0.5 for losers, so loser returns are again considerably better 
accounted for.  Returns to winners and losers are explained by past prices, information 
availability and in a large part by market factors which dominate during the Global Financial 
Crisis.  Shadow momentum indicates price reversal for winners but not for losers.  Losers are 
also exposed to upside risk, but gain no significant benefit from downside risk. 
 
ASX200, Period 3 (July 2010 – July 2015) 
 𝑅<.//42- = 0.0717 + 0.361. logE𝑅"#'%&J − 329. 𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑚+ 𝜀 𝑅+,-42- = 0.504 + 113. 𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑚 − 310.𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑚+ 2.083. log	(𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑇𝑜𝑃𝑥𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜TV274) 	+ 𝜀 
 
Table 6: Regressor counts for ASX200 Period 3 
 Winners Losers 
Price 1 / 6 0 / 6 
Risk 1 / 2 2 / 2 
Volume 0 / 2 0 / 2 
Information Availability 0 / 3 0 / 3 
Semi-Strong EMH 0 / 2 0 / 2 
Market Factors 0 / 4 1 / 4 
 
R2 is 0.08 for both winners and losers, so explanatory power of the models is poor post GFC.  
Both winners and losers suffer from downside risk in this period, with downside risk indicating 
an unwanted rise in returns for losers. 
 
S&P500, Period 1 (April 2000 – May 2005) 
 𝑅<.//42- = 1.116 − 102. 𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑚 − 0.0546. log(𝑇𝑅) − 0.085. log(𝑀𝐶𝑎𝑝)+ 0.049. log(𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑇𝑜𝑃𝑥𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜) − 0.159. 𝑠𝑞𝑟𝑡(𝑅&) + 0.557.𝑅"#,TV274− 6213. 𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑚TV274 + 9001.𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑚TV274+ 1.011. log	(𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑇𝑜𝑃𝑥𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜TV274) + 𝜀 𝑅+,-42- = 1.465 + 0.46. 𝑅"# − 0.449. 𝑃𝑅 + 149. 𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑚 − 105. 𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑚− 0.127. log(𝑇𝑅) − 0.223. log(𝑀𝐶𝑎𝑝)+ 0.0875. log(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐴𝑔𝑒)+ 0.00316. 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑐 − 4436. 𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑚TV274+ 5258.𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑚TV274 + 𝜀 
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Table 7: Regressor counts for S&P500 Period 1 
 Winners Losers 
Price 0 / 6 2 / 6 
Risk 1 / 2 2 / 2 
Volume 1 / 2 1 / 2 
Information Availability 1 / 3 3 / 3 
Semi-Strong EMH 2 / 2 1 / 2 
Market Factors 4 / 4 2 / 4 
 
R2 is 0.21 for winners and 0.17 for losers.  Returns to winners are explained by downside risk, 
volume, information availability, semi-strong information and market factors, while returns 
to losers are explained by past prices, downside and upside risk, several information 
availability variables, and market risk. 
 
S&P500, Period 2 (June 2005 – June 2010) 
 𝑅<.//42- = 0.28 − 0.06. 𝑅"# − 0.327.𝑅"#'%& − 0.1. log(𝑀𝐶𝑎𝑝) + 0.00291.𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑐+ 0.241. 𝑠𝑞𝑟𝑡(𝑅&) + 𝜀 𝑅+,-42- = 1.083 − 0.238. 𝑅"# + 0.571. 𝑅"#'%& − 1.032.𝑃𝑅 + 145. 𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑚− 0.254. log(𝑀𝐶𝑎𝑝) + 0.00815. 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑐− 0.138. log(𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑇𝑜𝑃𝑥𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜) + 0.132. 𝑠𝑞𝑟𝑡(𝑅&) + 1.049.𝑅"#,TV274− 3205. 𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑚TV274 + 5230. 𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑚TV274+ 1.407. log	(𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑇𝑜𝑃𝑥𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜TV274) 	+ 𝜀 
 
Table 8: Regressor counts for S&P500 Period 2 
 Winners Losers 
Price 2 / 6 3 / 6 
Risk 0 / 2 1 / 2 
Volume 0 / 2 0 / 2 
Information Availability 2 / 3 2 / 3 
Semi-Strong EMH 1 / 2 2 / 2 
Market Factors 0 / 4 4 / 4 
 
R2 is 0.18 for winners and 0.46 for losers, so again losers are better accounted for.  Winners 
show a reversal for both momentum and shadow momentum, this likely being due to the 
Global Financial Crisis.  Losers show a reversal for both momentum and price ratio, and a 
strong correlation to the market. 
 
S&P500, Period 3 (July 2010 – July 2015) 
 𝑅<.//42- = 0.075 + 0.348. 𝑅"# − 0.384. log(𝑀𝑆) − 0.81.𝑅"#,TV274+ 0.644. log	(𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑇𝑜𝑃𝑥𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜TV274) + 𝜀 𝑅+,-42- = 1.461 − 3165.𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑚TV274 + 3.501. log(𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑇𝑜𝑃𝑥𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜TV274) + 𝜀 
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Table 9: Regressor counts for S&P500 Period 3 
 Winners Losers 
Price 2 / 6 0 / 6 
Risk 0 / 2 0 / 2 
Volume 0 / 2 0 / 2 
Information Availability 0 / 3 0 / 3 
Semi-Strong EMH 0 / 2 0 / 2 
Market Factors 2 / 4 2 / 4 
 
R2 is 0.08 for winners and 0.25 for losers, so losers are better accounted for, and in this case 




The models indicate the following stylised results. 
 
1. Some specific sources of momentum winner and loser returns appear relatively stable 
across time and between winner and loser models.  However: 
2. In general, the sources of momentum winner and loser returns change over time;  
3. In general, the sources of momentum winner and loser returns differ from each other (i.e. 
winner/loser asymmetry); 
4. There is distributional asymmetry for security-level risk; 
5. There is distributional symmetry for market-level risk; 
6. Momentum winner and loser returns are not generally well explained by linear models on 
the enhanced momentum variables studied; 
 
Result 1:  
There are specific components that tend to survive over time and be symmetric for winners 
and losers.  In particular, the market value of the market as a whole has a generally positive 
effect on winner and loser returns, whereas a security’s market capitalisation has a generally 
negative effect.  Thus the market’s market value has a positive (negative) influence on winner 
(loser) profitability, and a security’s market capitalisation has a negative (positive) influence 
on winner (loser) profitability.  This accords with Asness et al. (2014).  They argue against the 
“myths” that momentum returns are sporadic (myth 1), can only be exploited by shorting 
losers (myth 2), and that momentum is stronger for small cap stocks than large cap stocks 
(myth 3).  Our findings are that returns to momentum tends to come from winners for small-
cap stocks and from (shorting) losers on large-cap stocks (counter to myths 2 and 3), and that 




We find strong support for the theses of Grundy and Martin (2001) and Du and Watkins (2007) 
– that the sources of momentum profits vary with market state and over time.  Our three 
equal time periods coincide with pre-GFC, GFC and post-GFC periods, and it is clear that 
market effects dominate during the GFC period, as well as a momentum reversal in the US 
market.  This result calls for further research into momentum profits using techniques that 
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account for time variation (e.g. survival analysis, Multivariate Adaptive Regression Splines), 




In period 1, the ASX200 winners have a strong risk component to their explanation absent 
from the losers; the S&P500 winners have a strong market-factor explanation whereas the 
losers are better explained by information availability.  In period 2 (which contains the GFC), 
the ASX200 winners and losers and the S&P500 losers are dominated by market factors, but 
the returns to S&P500 winners show no influence by market factors and are largely 
unexplained.  In period 3 the ASX200 winner and loser returns and the S&P500 winner returns 
are poorly explained, and the S&P500 loser return model contains only the market factor 
component.  This winner/loser asymmetry indicates that different sections of the cross-
section of returns have different models, and this in turn suggests that machine learning 
ensemble techniques should be investigated.  The methodology employed in this paper can 
be viewed as an attempt to make a linear ensemble of multiple enhanced momentum 
hypotheses.  Machine learning ensemble techniques seek to create nonlinear ensembles of 
multiple generated hypotheses, for instance via voting in bootstrap aggregation, weighted 
voting in Bayesian classification, and recursion in boosting (Dietterich, 2000).  Investigation 
using these techniques is thus a natural extension of the current research.  
 
Result 4: 
The effects on returns of security-level upside and downside risk are generally asymmetric.  
This is true between winner and loser models, indicating winner/loser asymmetry, and within 
models, indicating distributional asymmetry.  In period 1, the ASX200 winners show double 
the exposure to detrimental downside risk than beneficial upside risk, whereas the losers 
show no exposure to either.  Conversely, in period 3, the ASX200 losers show triple the 
exposure to detrimental upside risk than to beneficial downside risk, whereas the winners 
show only exposure to detrimental downside risk.  The S&P500 winners show exposure only 
to detrimental downside risk in period 1, and the losers to detrimental upside risk in period 
2.  The fruitful relaxation of the symmetric distribution assumption for a single regressor 
indicates that nonparametric methods should be investigated. 
 
Result 5: 
Unlike security-level risks, the effects on returns of market-level upside and downside risk are 
generally symmetric.  This is true across winner and loser models, indicating winner/loser 
symmetry, and within models, indicating distributional symmetry.  Market level upside and 
downside risks are generally either present or absent in both winner and loser models, the 
only exception being the S&P500 in period 2, and are generally both present with similar 
magnitude, the exception being the S&P500 in period 3.  Together, results 4 and 5 indicate 
that security-level variance is asymmetrical while market-level variance is symmetrical.  This 
has implications for the calculation of security betas which need to be investigated.  
 
Result 6: 
Returns to losers were almost universally better explained than returns to winners – another 
form of winner/loser asymmetry - but none of the models explained momentum winner or 
loser returns well, despite the large number of enhanced momentum ranking variables in the 
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regressor set.  In particular, the information discreteness (ID) of Da et al. (2014) was not 
selected in any model, and the volume-based continuing overreaction (CO) and turnover ratio 
(TR) of Byun et al. (2014) and Lee and Swaminathan (2000) made only rare appearances.  
Information availability, risk, and market factors were the three most prevalent sources of 
winner and loser returns, but they were generally not prevalent in both winner and loser 
models at the same time.  Semi-strong EMH information was more common in the S&P500 
models than the ASX200 models, indicating perhaps that the Australian market was the more 
informationally efficient over the periods studied.  However, the generally low R2 indicates 
either that the sources of momentum winner and loser returns remain undiscovered, or that 
linear models are not the appropriate way to explain them.  Furthermore, while several of 
the successful enhanced momentum anomalies studied by Jacobs (2015) seem to be 
unrelated to standard momentum, they are still successful strategies, as are other similar 
strategies not investigated here such as the style momentum of Chan and Docherty (2016).  
The three implications for future work from result 6 are: firstly, that those enhanced 
momentum variables which we were not able to include in this paper (analyst forecast 
dispersion, credit rating, and breadth of ownership) need to be investigated where the 
current regressor set may have been lacking; secondly, that nonlinear techniques could be 
profitably employed to produce better models than the linear ones; and thirdly, that further 
study may be required on winners minus losers anomalies in general, rather than focussing 
on specific winners minus losers anomalies, such as momentum or the many enhanced 





We found information availability, risk, and market factors to be generally better than past 
prices, past volumes and semi-strong EMH information at explaining winner and loser returns, 
but asymmetrically between winner and loser models.  We found the use of upper and lower 
semivariance effective in highlighting both distributional and winner/loser asymmetry.  We 
also found that returns to losers are significantly better explained than returns to winners, 
but that momentum returns in general are still difficult to explain using linear models.  We 
find even more strongly than Du and Watkins that the momentum anomaly cannot be 
explained by a single linear model with time invariant regressors.  Where the Du and Watkins 
2007 result called for the study of the momentum anomaly using time-varying techniques, 
our findings of winner/loser asymmetry and risk asymmetry calls for an investigation of 
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